The Fetishization of Virtue: Power, Membership and Europe’s Crisis of Solidarity

Democracy, to most, is the promise that those who govern them will align with the interests of the many. Yet far too many ignore another perspective, one which has held a grip on contemporary Western politics. A political class is capable of losing the confidence of its citizens whilst not losing confidence in its own good, a behavior backdropped by an environment where the losses and gains can nonetheless be mutually accommodating. As this elite class's appeal becomes less convincing to the common polity, it reacts by showing them the refined nature of its intentions. After all, how does one explain a closed factory? Will the self-proclaimed enlightened leader levy his reputation of cosmopolitan learnedness to evade responsibility, or will he address what role his policy played in it and how he will address the workers he displaced? Well, let me tell you of the political climate that effectuates when the first takes precedence over the second. One where, when we feel our magistrates have fallen short of our demands, they retain the ability to adjudicate whether we have come to such conclusions with sufficient virtue. One where we, the citizens, must be cognisant of our limitations in the face of institutions who reluctantly acknowledge us as their own.

This is the fetishization of virtue. Specific to Europe, this is an arena where politicians have elevated the value of approved attitudes into maces of political authority whilst failing to provide us with the invoice of what this authority has accomplished. An expression evident in cultural and economic behavior. At this intersection where market liberalism and professional moralism meet, one holds the foundation that mere expansion of economic activity is a sufficient public good, while the other requires one to emancipate themselves from their inherited attachments to be a participant in progress itself. Where Europeans are required to dogmatically accept any changes to their livelihood as economic necessities, and where they resist being reduced to bigoted, uneducated provincialists. The outcome of this formula is a governing class that both reserves judgement over its polity and cordons off such polity's sentiments from its preferred projects. Chief amongst these is the project of European Integration. What once pledged to be a political project that sought to improve the living conditions of steel and coal workers has now become a project that no longer focuses on what it can deliver to an average worker and now rather focuses on the virtue of those who lead and influence it. The union is now in danger: as membership and EU institutions continue to expand, they do so without providing a reason to those who must carry the disproportionate costs, making for an unsustainable political arrangement.

Machiavelli long ago noted that in the operation of political life, it was easy to fall into the trap of considering imagined goodness to be a marker for good political judgement.[1] While I do not pass the burden of knowledge surrounding political philosophy to every reader, I ask you to keep the following in mind: a government cannot ultimately escape answering for its internal order and security, the capacities it yields, and the allegiances it finds itself capable of sustaining. Should it find itself incapable when redress is required, it will not be able to rely on the evidence of its excellent intentions.

In Europe, I see a weakening of accountability over national political communities. I will demonstrate this by turning my eyes to France and Britain, examining the two related substitutes: the employer-aligned demand towards higher migration, and academia's chokehold of authority on colonial legacies in the name of sustaining collective agency. I have used, and will continue to refer to, an elite. However, one does not need to imagine a grand conspiracy of bankers and professors coming together to solidify power; rather, observe how these behaviors belong to overlapping political tendencies. One that can be analyzed by observing how, in the changing electoral setting, ruling elites, with their obsession with professional moral authority and growing culture of sophistication detached from the polity, will now have to answer for the bill. Forcing a return to the most foundational question of politics, “Who gets what, when, how?”[2]

I first point to the work of Piketty and the altering state of electoral arrangements in French politics. In the fifties and sixties, the proportion of university graduates versus non-graduates who voted left was separated by around twenty percentage points. This gap would further narrow in the eighties when it approached zero, and see a superficial widening in the 2000s as it reversed direction. Why did the educational advantage on voting patterns reverse? This gradual transformation is one that survives typical controls for social characteristics we consider in political science. It is not one to be dismissed as a consequence of younger people possessing more credentials of qualification than their predecessors, nor one explained by one bad politician or election.[3] Across the channel, Britain demonstrates related behavior, as the educational profile of the average Labour voter sees a reversal in support, whilst those in possession of high wealth continue to favour the right. They aligned, as Piketty describes them, with the “Brahmin Left” and “Merchant Right”, who seek to garner social advantage through different forms rather than just wealth consolidation.[4] Every graduate is not a millionaire, but nevertheless they are increasingly forming a common constituency that distinguishes itself on both education and financial resources, cutting out representation for the majority who possess neither.

I adopt Piketty’s mechanism, which reveals how educational elites mark success through one's educational efforts in the academy, while business elites interpret it through entrepreneurial economic yield. Beliefs that are held by a class of people who limit the experience of the majority and can conveniently begin to forget the inherited advantages that helped them arrive at such achievements. Looking inward, both groups arrive at a convenient explanation as to their place in the social order. For the academic will never turn away from promoting the need for government to devote expense towards advanced degrees, nor will the businessman ever fail to argue for lower taxation. Neither of these interests services or transfers the supplies of what those who fall out of this closed category deem valuable.

All this serves to create real political implications. While rival elites contest over the appropriate mechanism of advancement, they ignore the question of the necessity of participating in them. This happens because to them, disagreement exists on which achievements are worthy of conferring authority, who of their competitors should receive what assistance, and in this framework what provides for fair competition. The question of how someone who fails to reach either of these upper rungs should live becomes one of secondary, not primary, concern. In my introduction, I stated that most believe democracy will “promise that those who govern them will align with the interests of the many.” If one is to subscribe to this idea, an irony emerges. The individuals whose needs are placed secondary are not a marginal exception in their political community. Throughout history, any human state or society that resembles even the most basic forms of development and organization has formed hierarchies. Modern economies are no different, requiring individuals to do work that conveys little prestige. The political settlement that supports this in liberal democratic societies is one where the ordinary worker holds a promise that his child might escape their position, leaving the worth of his very own position unexplained.

This problem isn’t uniquely recent either. Consider Blair’s 1998 “Third Way.” In it, Blair painted education, employability, and enterprise as the core instruments of a renewing social democracy. Who would dare oppose? Higher educational standards, after all, appealed to both rival elites with their ability to serve international competitiveness and pseudo-social inclusion; Blair sought to turn welfare into a machine for making participation in this work possible.[5] This is not to charge Blair with being indifferent to material conditions; rather, I place significance elsewhere. This change of direction saw a shift from a left which was previously associated with producer interests to one focused on people succeeding in this changing economy.

How this vision would play out at the scale of nations proved difficult. Susceptible to the hierarchy I’ve already mentioned, while a policy may advance one person's advancement, in no way does it create an automatic settlement for everyone. If everyone has the same credential, just a few decades earlier used to distinguish a few, it is logical to assume that the advantage of such a credential withers. Fundamentally, work will still be divided, with a great part of it being the kind that has both low income and authority. All this aspirational striving while nothing is to be said about the people helping fuel it. Meritocracy becomes the evasive mechanism to avoid confronting the conditions faced by the ordinary, as he is invited to become extraordinary. Simply put, you cannot ask your citizens to cease resembling most of your citizens.

I now need to examine the cultural extension of this mistake. Take the work of social theorist Catherine Liu at the University of California, Irvine, and what she labels “Virtue Hoarders.” Through her research, she presents a critical examination of the professional managerial class, a class which she describes as the credentialed workers and institutional intermediaries who, through their position, influence the continued reproduction of their authority and proliferation of chosen culture. Central to her claim is that these forces work to turn what are collective conflicts on distribution into individual performances of righteousness.[6] This in turn helps turn politics into a game of self-discipline; the player, whether politician, orbiter, or voter, is required to be ever aware of speaking the right way, consuming the right way, and being sensible in the right way. How one carries these credentials is what determines whether they may be enlightened enough for membership amongst the decision makers.

While you may be quick to disregard Liu’s account as being principally American, you’d be disservicing yourself by not observing the actual useful mechanism that can be connected to Europe specifically. One where a cycle takes place with the reproduction of advantages by professional families that already interpret success with the cultivation of values and aptitude. My interpretation does not advance the argument that real achievement and unequal preparation are mutually exclusive. Rather, I highlight the mistake that emerges when we treat the first as proof of success and the second as irrelevant heresy. As the above-mentioned natural course begins to extend “logic” beyond examinations of credentials, informal qualifications such as conforming to the approved ways of speaking and interpreting society begin to determine who can be heard. If a citizen points to an existing material issue, yet fails to stake his claim in the politically correct way in the eyes of the institution meant to resolve it, his point is seen as deficient.

Ironically so, this mechanism can be institutionally demonstrated when looking at university equality work. In her research, Sara Ahmed showed how commitments aimed at improving an institution's “social” appearance did not reliably show an actual change in conduct. Her focus on effective antiracist practices would observe the gap that emerged between proclamations of commitment and organizational actions. The demonstration to pay attention to here is how institutions can indeed acquire moral credit for taking decisions on signaling whilst preserving arrangements that practically prevent a decision from taking effect.[7] In doing so, these institutions, which I have already established yield enormous influence on the governing culture, give assent to ideas while leaving their actual implementation and the difficulties that may come with it to someone else.

In Europe, this plays out through the political debates surrounding migration, where one can observe the clear distinction between elites who yield advantage and general public interest. Increasing production, raising profitable recruitment, and yielding more control over a national economy are all different achievements. The advancement of one of them does not provide for, and in cases may even conflict with, the deliverance of all three. With migration, to whom are these gains distributed? Whatever the answer, the political justification is not left to be settled simply by calling a policy “open” or “modern” or “compassionate.” Realism requires an actual examination of the created settlement, and the means available to maintain it.

In conversations with colleagues and academic supervisors (especially those who are zoomers or alternatively whose academic work has served to defend different PMC institutions), I have anecdotally observed a symptomatic reaction that assumes all objections to treating aggregate growth as sufficient justification for migration to be a populist invention, yet in reality it hardly is. One can look back to 2008 in Britain, when the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee challenged the British government on using total GDP to assess the positive impact of immigration. A larger population producing more output does not necessarily translate to an improvement in living standards for existing citizens, with even GDP per head seeing a difference when observing the composition of the incoming population.[8] The Lords were holding the fire to the incumbent left-leaning Labour government, revealing that economic reductionism was a cross-party disease.

Here the political accounting error is more relevant than labeling which member of the duopoly made it. For example, should a policy create substantial gains for employers and consumers, but do so by concentrating the costs everywhere else, an extra column of growth is demonstrably failing at proving that the state is meeting its obligations. Rather, in considering such a policy, the state must decide whether the costs are acceptable or alternatively who should absorb them. In the democratic system, the people bearing such costs are members of the polity whose cooperation the government will ultimately require. It’s silly to think an argument of arithmetic where somebody's gains are exceeding their losses will be sustainable.

Given the broadly affecting nature of jobs, labour is a pertinent issue subject to this accounting. Labour shortages are the justification most employers utilize when advocating for an increase in migration; however, labour shortages themselves are dependent on the wages and working conditions currently on offer to a domestic workforce. Martin Ruhs and Bridget Anderson have been successful in demonstrating through their research how institutional dependence can emerge from an excess reliance on migrant recruitment, entrenching poor working conditions and unattractive recruitment incentives.[9] One does not need to have advanced training in economics to quickly arrive at the logical question of how this may affect the state's capability to set wages, or that same state’s policy on maintaining its existing occupational standards at home. So what may at first seem like a temporary measure to help fill gaps in demand when they arise can become a self-cementing mechanism where this provision becomes a permanent fixture. Opponents to this conclusion will try to frame this as a two-sided issue: those who seek to adapt to a changing economy and those who seek to preserve it. This is not to say that economic realities around labour vacancies cannot exist, rather that labour importation is not deserving of dogmatic adherence as the singular solution. Does providing an employer with the cheapest remedy at his disposal provide the country with a better future? I don’t believe so. The real issue revealed here revolves around the institutions who get to decide who is prioritized and who is neglected, consequently accumulating a debt on behalf of the entire political community for present convenience.

My claim is not made in a theoretical vacuum either. If one considers the distributional evidence, they will quickly come to realize that a shared single national average is a falsehood. Preston, Dustmann and Frattini would observe how, between the late nineties and early two-thousands, wage pressure would concentrate downward, with the group most affected being the one that fell roughly below the twentieth percentile of native wage distribution, while positive effects were present on the higher end of this distribution. In the backdrop of lower wages not seeing a direct fall, the argument for immigration held strong as it held back wage growth while building earnings elsewhere.[10] Without establishing a broader policy verdict for every migration case, I demonstrate here that average benefits have coexisted in conflict as to who receives them.

The pressures faced do not end at the question of wages. I arrive at the question of culture. Who gets to decide how a community continues? If the primary incentive for migration is economic conditions, how do free and democratic societies balance equal citizenship for admitted immigrants whilst also pushing integration (or alternatively assimilation)? One must first give proper substance to the idea that a country is not just an endlessly expanding labour market. The institutions that wield capacity do so because they operate where an incentive exists to obey. Public attachment to the state has historically served as one of these conditions. A historical memory, shared language, and common perception of institutions all work in service of this cooperation between sovereign and subject. Values which don’t necessarily require inheritance nor a conservative approach to keeping culture unchanged. They do, however, require a sovereign who can assign protection to practices deserving of transmission, and one who does not fear establishing requirements of integration on newcomers the same as on its citizens. Absent this, these institutions will retain no basis for any continued loyalty.

For a government to retain control over who receives admission into its polity, with a clear policy as to how integration must function, is simply an act of defending the state. To act otherwise is to treat immigrant citizens as provisional members, members who are not expected to stand behind the banner conferred unto them. The alternative is one where newcomers are simply useful units of labour, with the costs falling on those who I have previously established are inadequately expected to absorb the consequences that come with it.

Relevant to this matter of culture is that of decolonisation. Principally, decolonisation would ideally be considered a project of providing a free people with the right of self-governance. In practice, however, it has become, through the proclaimed practice of modern “anticolonialism”, a political project that seeks to establish who has professional authority over our understanding of experience. The world is a big place, and a large part of it was colonized by the twentieth century. The various individuals who fought against a colonial overlord did not speak in one voice, nor did they come from the same cultures or share the same values. Contemporary postcolonial and decolonial theories are not one and the same. The project that sought to conquer political independence and bring productive capacity to its citizenry is a shell of its former self, now seeking to determine the intellectual legitimacy of our inherited institutions. Even amongst anticolonial philosophers, this is not a contested point. In The Wretched of the Earth, Frantz Fanon was early to criticize the process of nationalisation in these previously conquered lands, arguing that a domestic bourgeoisie of educated elites was more focused on capturing the advantages and positions left by colonial rule rather than dedicating themselves to the service of national development. The capture of these positions served this class while providing little real-world improvement to those on the ground. One only needs to look at the conditions of the average citizen in the postcolonial societies Fanon describes to see that the transfer of power alone does not guarantee an improvement in ordinary life.[11]

In neglecting my described distinctions, we subject our institutions to question. An institution's historical participation in domination does not automatically impeach its contemporary soundness. While origin, for instance, may serve as a valuable tool in helping us understand why questions were ignored or previous testimony went unheard, it does little to settle any of the subsequent questions that follow. Most people who have pursued an undergraduate degree would have heard the fabled words “As an x man” or “As a y woman”, and will need no convincing that we now place a great degree of value on the pedigree of a person making an argument. However, it is in this environment where our intellectual environment, one which claims to be about intellectual liberation, has acquired new systems of licensed authorities. We have chosen to certify emancipation over competency. This danger I highlight is not some far-fetched conspiracy. Research has shown debates about postcolonial states have evolved into debates of postcoloniality through general cultural interpretations. Aijaz Ahmad was right to criticize Homi K. Bhabha when he pointed out something intellectuals rarely recognize: amongst the previously colonized, postcolonial theory accorded privilege to the metropolitan migrant intellectual, not those who participated in the mass movements of liberation in which political commitments were rooted.[12] Now that we have professionalized the interpretation of domination, one cannot help but ask, who carries authority over such interpretation?

Having provided you with, and proven, the circumstances the West finds itself in today, I arrive at my central question: Europe. Modern-day European society is one of the most free and fair societies in the long story of human history. It is foolish to believe one can erase any of the criticisms that have begun to besiege it. Should the national communities of Europe have any hope to continue through their democratic institutions, they will have to distinguish their current domination from the historical one. An endless audit of our moral ancestry is not suited to serve as a replacement for good political judgement. In our modern times, we are more than capable of grounding specific responsibility for a historic wrong, whilst not making every contemporary citizen guilty, nor every inherited institution a continuing instrument of oppression. Should Europe continue down the current path, guilt is destined to become a tool for dirty politics. Where, when invoked, its opponent has no worthy defense. One where, as in the case of Europe, institutions in control of resource distribution can permanently alter the credentials needed to administer. The European elite has expanded, but in no way has this elite's broader relation with society changed. The same goes for the institutions this elite controls. Finding more elaborate ways to account for past oppressions that died many generations ago in no way will help the historically ignored majority.

If I am to consider the relationship between how one's social position actually affects one's idea of their European Identity, Theresa Kuhn’s research will be instrumental to demonstrating why my theory is relevant to European Integration. In analyzing transnational interactions, Kuhn was able to show that participation in cross-border practices or European networks was unevenly distributed, especially when looking at younger educated Europeans. It was the individuals who took part in these cross-border practices and networks that were, as one would logically expect, more in favor of integration. Conversely, although society around them was becoming increasingly transnational, those who fell outside this group did not provide the same support.[13] Applying this analysis to my own argument, I claim here this shows that whilst integration in terms of increasing member states or papered agreements has been on the rise, how this integration is actually experienced is a matter of social division. This is extraordinarily relevant to European Integration. Consider, for example, a university graduate who has seen their opportunities expand given their access to easy international movement, versus a service worker who now encounters increased competition in her locality. If integration is vital to protecting Europe, it is an educated class that is asking for an increase in opportunities while mistaking it for someone else's opportunity.

European Integration, being a political instrument, requires its advocates to answer for what it provides. Ironically, at the time of the Schuman Declaration, this was more clear, being founded for the common interests and improvement of workers’ living conditions, carrying with it a practical and identifiable obligation.[14] The present arrangement, however, has shifted from this norm, as pushes for a wider European institutional mandate are made by its institutions’ occupying class, leaving that mandate more unclear. Just take, for example, French attitudes when it comes to immigration and redistribution. Amongst the French voters Piketty studied, he noticed a pattern where supporting more open immigration policy did not necessarily imply support for policies of redistribution.[15] I therefore challenge what I determine to be an elite moralism, and the self-certification of one's solidarity with the working class on the basis of having more “liberal” views on borders.

Europe’s political communities are not going to grow more confident as a result of their ruling classes' demonstrations of virtuous intentions. Rather, European Integration and the European political project require governance that is able to organise and defend obligations that incentivize membership in the European project beyond “oh I’m here to make money.” Only once these leaders reclaim their courage to govern on issues they have made taboo, such as migration, and stop the endless indictment of their inherited institutions, will sustainable European Integration be possible. Till then, the fetishization of virtue has become the substitute for the worthy ruler, an absurdity which has rulers more focused on their own enlightened image rather than policies which command the common allegiances needed to survive.

References

  1. Machiavelli, Niccolò. 1532. The Prince. Chapter XV. English translation by W. K. Marriott. ↩

  2. Lasswell, Harold D. 1936. Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. New York: Whittlesey House. ↩

  3. Piketty, Thomas. 2018. Brahmin Left vs Merchant Right: Rising Inequality & the Changing Structure of Political Conflict (Evidence from France, Britain and the US, 1948–2017). WID.world Working Paper 2018/7. See also the France, US and UK figures and tables, particularly Figures 2.3–2.5 and 2.13, and Table 2.1. Cited here: Figures 2.3–2.5. ↩

  4. Piketty, 2018. ↩

  5. Blair, Tony. 1998. “The Third Way.” 21 September. Reproduced by Hanover College from the British government website. ↩

  6. Liu, Catherine. 2021. Virtue Hoarders: The Case against the Professional Managerial Class. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. ↩

  7. Ahmed, Sara. 2006. “The Nonperformativity of Antiracism.” Meridians 7 (1): 104–126. ↩

  8. House of Lords, Select Committee on Economic Affairs. 2008. The Economic Impact of Immigration. First Report of Session 2007–08, HL Paper 82-I. Chapter 3. Paragraphs 48–51. ↩

  9. Ruhs, Martin, and Bridget Anderson. 2013. “Migrant Workers: Inevitability or Policy Choice?” In Making Migration Work: The Future of Labour Migration in the European Union, 69–82. Amsterdam University Press. ↩

  10. Dustmann, Christian, Tommaso Frattini, and Ian P. Preston. 2013. “The Effect of Immigration along the Distribution of Wages.” The Review of Economic Studies 80 (1): 145–173. ↩

  11. Fanon, Frantz. 1961. The Wretched of the Earth. Chapter 3, “The Pitfalls of National Consciousness.” English translation by Constance Farrington. ↩

  12. Ahmad, Aijaz. 1997. “Postcolonial Theory and the ‘Post-’ Condition.” Socialist Register 33: 353–381. Cited here: pp. 370–373. ↩

  13. Kuhn, Theresa. 2011. “Individual Transnationalism, Globalisation and Euroscepticism: An Empirical Test of Deutsch’s Transactionalist Theory.” European Journal of Political Research 50: 811–837. ↩

  14. Schuman, Robert. 1950. Schuman Declaration. 9 May. ↩

  15. Piketty, 2018, Figure 2.13 and Table 2.1. ↩